The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is labeling possible political opponents "divisionist" and taking steps to silence them in order to ensure victory in upcoming elections. In late March President Paul Kagame warned that he would "wound" "divisionists" who threatened to undermine national unity and reprimanded foreign donors who give money to "people to teach divisions." The Transitional National Assembly (TNA) voted unanimously to recommend dissolving the second largest political party in the country, the Mouvement Démocratique Republicain (Democratic Republican Movement, MDR) because of its "divisionism." The MDR has been a political ally of the RPF since 1992 and a participant in the RPF-led unity government since it was established in 1994. Two high-ranking military officers singled out as "divisionist" fled the country while others were arrested or "disappeared." A deputy of the assembly and other citizens have also "disappeared." The government-influenced press has amplifi ed the criticisms, sometimes attacking persons like the prime minister by name. Officials and press alike linked "divisionism" to the prospect of another genocide, thus heightening fears and tensions between the groups they profess to be unifying.

Unity in the Face of Elections

In July 1994 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the Hutu Power government responsible for a genocide of at least half a million Tutsi and thousands of Hutu opposed to Hutu Power. Since that time, a transitional government of persons named by the RPF and the other political parties that signed the Arusha Accords has ruled the country. The elections scheduled for late 2003 will choose a president and legislators to replace this transitional government.

When presidential elections were announced, no candidate sprang forward to contest the current incumbent.¹ But in early March Faustin Twagiramungu, first prime minister of the 1994 post-genocidal government and now in exile, announced his intention to return to Rwanda to run for the presidency. His announcement suggested the possibility of a real contest for the post. A long-time leader of the MDR , he would be expected to draw considerable support from among party members.

Rwandan president and RPF head Paul Kagame threatened this rival and others in several recent speeches. On March 31 Kagame told listeners that elections would be "carried out peacefully and in a transparent manner." But in an apparent reference to Twagiramungu and perhaps other contenders, he continued:

I can even say that the outcomes of these elections are known. Those elected will be individuals who are 100 per cent in line with the current political agenda, aimed at building the country. This will be the case, and I am sure that it is also your view and your wish to have national security, unity, development and democracy. Anyone who would bring in division-because I know that the views of those who intend to come back are based on division-will not be elected.

In the same speech he warned that he would "wound" any who failed to understand and heed his message against "divisionism." In a threatening metaphor, he said that any who expected to profit from the "sorghum and corn" they had sown-presumably a reference to political rather than agricultural activities-should remember that "we have enough machines to crush the grains...." In an apparent reference to the flight of several high-ranking military officers the previous day (see below), Kagame announced that some people would soon be fired from government posts because they were suspected of wanting to flee the country.²

In a speech on April 7 at the ceremony commemorating victims of genocide, Kagame criticized the "bad policy of foreigners who support division." He implied that by aiding civil society foreign donors helped sow division, a theme taken up a week later by deputies in the assembly.³

The attack on "divisionism" accelerated early in the year when authorities held a series of workshops with local government officials in preparation for elections. In Kibungo, the official speaker insisted on the "delicacy" of the period and reportedly said, "Any divisionism will be smashed-not with a hammer. But you are adults, you know what I mean." At a similar meeting in Ruhengeri, the speaker led a kind of call and response session much like the political "animation" meetings that were frequent under the government of Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994). His theme was that "unity" was a baby that needed to be kept at the breast until its mother-presumably the RPF-decided it was ready to be weaned.⁴

Expansion of RPF Power

During the years of war and bitter inter-party struggle that culminated in the 1994 genocide, many Rwandan leaders manipulated ethnic and political divisions in a desperate bid to hold on to power. With the establishment of the new government, the RPF rejected the divisions of the past and made unity a central focus of its policy. During the nine years of transition it has used the need for unity to attempt to justify increasingly tight control over political life.

The government operates under a "Fundamental Law" (the 1991 constitution, the 1993 Arusha Peace Accords, the July 17, 1994 declaration of the RPF, and a November 1994 agreement among political parties that divides official posts among various political parties.) The RPF, as the victorious military force, was dominant from the start, but there was originally a show of parity among the leading political groups, the RPF and the MDR, and two smaller groups, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Liberal Party (PL). Over the years, the RPF increased its official share of posts to more accurately reflect the real extent of its power. As of late 2002, the president of the republic, twelve of fifteen ministers⁵ (and most of the secretary-generals of ministries), the chief judges on the Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation, the prosecutor general of the republic, eleven of twelve governors, thirteen of fifteen ambassadors, seven of nine heads of security services, and nineteen of seventy-four assembly members (thirteen for the RPF, six for its military branch, the Rwandan Defense Forces, RDF) were members of or affiliated with the RPF.⁶

By mutual agreement, all political parties are supposed to refrain from grass-roots organizing and recruitment during the trans itional period. The RPF has ignored this undertaking and has greatly increased its membership. A leading RPF official admitted the increase but asserted that it resulted from spontaneous requests to join the party which could not be denied without restricting the individual's right to free political association. In at least some cases, persons have joined the RPF because they believed they had no choice and some have been threatened with sanctions if they chose not to do so.⁷

In view of the coming elections, the RPF stepped up recruitment of new members in at least four provinces during the last week of April and the first week of May. In several places local officials or party organizers called people to meetings at sector offices where they were publicly pressured to join and to get others to join the RPF. In one case, approximately half the group agreed. Officials continued to "persuade" those who refused to join until finally all but 20 percent of the original number had accepted RPF membership. In a sector in another province, people were told that they should aim to make 90 percent of their neighbors into RPF members. One reluctant recruit said he had initially refused to join but that he changed his mind when told that he would otherwise be seen as a supporter of another party. He said, "I agreed because I was afraid of being labeled a supporter of one of the divisionist parties like the MDR or Ubuyanja."⁸ One RPF member said:

Those who taught me said that the RPF is not a party but rather a family⁹ and that all Rwandans should be part of this family. Those who don't join are outsiders. They are the ones who cause instability in the country. We should build the family to prepare for elections. It would be dangerous to be governed by someone from outside the family.

The RPF tries particularly to recruit respected local persons, such as teachers, medical assistants, and traders.¹⁰

Even this description gives a less than complete picture of RPF control because the other political parties, while permitted to exist, hardly function as vigorous autonomous organizations. After 1994 when the National Republican Movement for Development and Democracy (MRND) and the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) were banned for their role in the genocide, the most important party left-apart from the RPF--was the MDR, but even it had been shorn of a significant part of its strength because of the split with the MDR-Power wing just before the genocide (see below). The PSD had never extended its base outside southern Rwanda and the PL was limited largely to urban areas. These parties have generally observed the prohibition on local political activity and have done nothing to recreate or extend their organization at grass-roots level. Restricted to meetings at the level of the central committees, the parties have focused on internal struggles, many of them for posts or other form of personal gain. Such squabbling discredits party leaders among ordinary people and weakens support both for particular parties and for the larger concept of multiparty politics. In addition, parties operate under the supervision of the forum of political parties, an institution without any legal basis and dominated by the RPF. The forum can and does intervene in such internal party matters as designations of persons to posts, including to legislative seats, and enforces a code of behavior on party members.

 

The Risk of Multiparty Elections: The Burundi Model

Even while the RPF agreed to work within a multiparty framework, some of its leaders expressed serious misgivings about the risks posed by such a system. In 1995, Kagame told a journalist that unbridled multipartyism would result in "dividing people who are already divided," making any long-term hope of unity and democracy impossible.¹¹ In line with this philosophy, the government directed that candidates for local elections in 2001 and 2002 must stand without any party affiliation. But with the transition-already once extended-approaching its end, Kagame promised that presidential and legislative elections would be held, presumably with parties free to present candidates. He also announced that elections would be by universal direct suffrage and secret ballot.

Despite the tight control exercised by the RPF, some soldiers and political leaders expres sed fear that direct, secret elections might produce unexpected results, as had a free and fair election in Burundi in 1993.¹² Like Rwanda, Burundi is peopled by a large Hutu majority with Tutsi representing a small minority of the population. The Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party, which controlled the army and much of the administration, presented the incumbent Pierre Buyoya as its candidate in presidential elections. Most members expected an easy victory, but Melchior Ndadaye, the Hutu candidate of FRODEBU, defeated Buyoya.

Torn by squabbles at the top, with its grass-roots network atrophied, the MDR would seem to pose little threat to the RPF. But no one can assess the residual loyalty lying dormant among former and inactive members, a loyalty based at least in part on a perceived link between the current MDR and the first MDR party, the MDR-Parmehutu which led the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy beginning in 1959. With multiparty elections by secret ballot looming, the easiest way to remove any possibility of an MDR upset would be to remove the party itself.

The Assembly Inquiry: Division and "Divisionism"

In mid-December Deputy Abbas Mukama asked the Transitional National Assembly to address the problem of the MDR. On December 30, 2002, the assembly charged him and six other deputies to examine divisions within the MDR and the role played by the party in the "divisions which had characterized Rwandan history."¹³ Even before the commission began its work, the head of the MDR group close to the RPF was predicting the abolition of the party.¹⁴ On April 14, the commission presented its report to the assembly, a document that included a summary of thirty-five pages (in French translation) with an annex that totaled more than 1000 pages.¹⁵ Commission members consulted government officials, "wise persons," and at least one uni versity researcher; they also relied extensively on various security services to provide data that was said to prove their allegations concerning "divisionism."

The commission made two important charges against the MDR: that it could not resolve its own internal disputes and that it was "divisionist," promoting the same pro-Hutu ideology originally developed by the MDR-Parmehutu party in 1959. At one point the commission even stated explicitly that this MDR ideology led to the 1994 genocide.¹⁶

The commission did establish the first contention, that the MDR had been split in the past and that it remained torn by struggles over leadership and ideology. But such dissension violates no statute and is no reason to dissolve a party. In describing the most recent disputes over policy and leadership, the commission relates how government official s, including the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the minister of local administration intervened in matters internal to the party and regulated by its own rules. The extent of outside official participation in such disputes demonstrates the lack of autonomy of the MDR.¹⁷

The very success of the commission in confirming disputes in the MDR undercuts its second argument, that the current party has continuously held a single ideology since 1959. Important points in the development of the MDR include the following:

• The most important party at the start of the new republic in 1962, the MDR-Parmehutu was abolished with other parties by President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1975.
  
   
• The MDR was reestablished in 1991 after Habyarimana agreed to permit multipartyism again. MDR leaders at the time affirmed a general dedication to the "light brought by MDR- PARMEHUTU"¹⁸ but took no explicitly ethnically-based stand. Indeed, the RPF itself had no trouble allying with the MDR first informally and then more formally after mid-1992.
  
   
• In July 1993 the MDR divided: one wing (MDR-Power) espoused Hutu Power ideology and participated actively in the genocide but the other, led by Twagiramungu, rejected the genocide and remained loyal to its RPF alliance. Leaders of this part of the MDR, including Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, were slain by genocidal killers and proponents of Hutu Power.
  
   
• With the establishment of the new government, the RPF welcomed the participation of the Twagiramungu wing of the MDR. According to the commission, the MDR was seen as one of the parties " that had "dissociated itself from the discriminatory ideology which characterized the PARMEHUTU."¹⁹
  
   
• Following pressure from official and other political sources in 1998 and 1999, MDR leaders agreed to change some policies and some symbols, like the party flag. To demonstrate its openness to all Rwandans, the MDR recruited some Tutsi, two of whom hold assembly seats.²⁰
  
   
• Contending factions within the MDR have since disputed the extent to which agreed-to changes have been or should be made; personal rivalries among party leaders have complicated these substantive issues.

   

Unable to explain how MDR leaders could be said to adhere to a single doctrine while splitting over ideological issues as they did in 1993 and since 1999, commission members were left concluding that the discriminatory ideology was "like a drug or a lover," that is, an inescapable force that adherents could not shake. For this there was only one remedy, said the commission report: "remove yourself from it or all join together to eradicate it."²¹

The commission did not try to explain how the RPF managed to ally with the MDR-or at least with a portion of the MDR-from 1991 through 2003. The record of this twelve-year alliance is in itself sufficient to discredit the claim that the MDR was committed to a genocidal ideology throughout that period.

"Divisionism" Dissected

Several of the specific charges leveled at the MDR relate to the general claim that its ideology is genocidal. Adherents are accused of :

• minimizing the genocide
  
   
• claiming that there had been a double genocide in 1994, meaning that the RPF had deliberately set out to eliminate Hutu in the same way that Hutu Power proponents had sought to eliminate Tutsi
  
   
• opposing compensation payments to genocide survivors
  
   
• opposing the ceremonial reburial of bodies of genocide victims.

   

Beyond these allegations related to the genocide, the commission charged MDR members with opposing current government programs, as if any such dissent were proof of "divisionism." It wrote, "In order for the state to carry through its mission successfully, it should unified in its actions."²² It said MDR members opposed such programs as administrative decentralization, gacaca jurisdictions (popular courts to try persons accused of genocide), and the Local Defense Force (a government-organized paramilitary force). It claimed also that MDR members resisted the influence of the RPF-dominated forum of political parties.

According to the commission, MDR members spread discontent in the army, discredited the government abroad so as to diminish foreign assistance, and, possibly, spied for a foreign power.

Commission members made a final major charge against MDR members: "They have secretly begun to teach the population to vote as was done in Burundi when they elected Ndadaye in 1993."²³ In the opening debate on the report, the head of the commission said that some of those interviewed intended "to play the political card of Frodebu during the elections,"²⁴ that is to follow the Burundian model. By such comments, commission members reveal their fear that the MDR will attract the vote of Hutu in upcoming elections. Should a significant number of Hutu vote on ethnic grounds, the MDR as the party historically identified with Hutu interests would emerge the winner.

The Accused

The commission named forty-six persons²⁵ as supporters of the MDR divisionist ideology, many of them important political or administrative figures. They include one secretary of state (forced by President Kagame to resign just before presentation of the report), five deputies, three high-ranking military officers, six members of the staff of the prime minister, one ambassador, a former prefect (governor) and head of the National Public Transportation Service. One of those named has been in jail since January 2002 and five others live abroad, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Belgium, New Zealand and China (the Rwandan ambassador to China).

In contrast to the list of charges leveled against the party members collectively, accusations against the named individuals amount to the one broad charge of having held or attended meetings where the ideology criticized by the commission was allegedly discussed. Under the heading "The Propaganda group of the MDR Parmehutu ideology," the forty-six accused are grouped into "those who are at the head," "those who participated rarely in meetings," and "Non-members of the MDR who participated in meetings" and another group from the province of Cyangugu.

The commission asked the General Commissioner of National Police if he had proof of these meetings. He stated:

The appropriate services have solid proof showing that secret meetings were organized by those who stand firm on the ideology of genocide; these meetings aimed at mobilization on an ethnic basis, mobilization done by young people who carry out divisionist activities everywhere out on the hills and who spread defamatory propaganda against the activities of the state. ²⁶

In the 900 pages examined by Human Rights Watch researchers, very few details are provided concerning the alleged meetings. One meeting is supposed to have taken place in Kibuye, but the person accused of having organized this meeting told the assembly that the event was a social occasion. Another person was reportedly in Europe when he was listed as attending a meeting while another was in prison. ²⁷

In addition to the general charge of attending meetings, one person is accused of suggesting the desirability of following the Burundian model from 1993 and of distributing "incendiary tracts." Several were said to have provided advice or money to members of a young people's association called Itara (literally, the light) or to an otherwise unidentified association for Hutu unity. Two were simply characterized as known extremists because of alleged activities in 1993. ²⁸

Two of the accused were linked to the banned Party for Democracy and Renewal-Ubuyanja (PDR-Ubuyanja). In a hearing of the commission, the minister of internal security stated that the group of Celestin Kabanda, listed as one of the fifteen top MDR propagandists, had held joint meetings with members of PDR-Ubuyanja. He said they had met at the Hotel Okapi, but that the PDR-Ubuyanja group had met on the ground floor and Kabanda's group upstairs in order to camouflage their collaboration.²⁹

Not all of the accused had a chance to be heard or to be fully heard by the commission and one who attempted to defend himself during the assembly debate was cut off. One deputy protested that another accused person had never had a chan ce to defend herself.³⁰

Flight, Arrest, and "Disappearances"

Brig. Gen. Emmanuel Habyarimana³¹, who was minister of defense until November 2002, and Lieut. Col. Balthazar Ndengeyinka, one of the army representatives to the assembly, fled Rwanda on March 30, apparently after having been informed that they would be accused of "divisionism" in the commission report. Lieutenant Alphonse Ndayambaje accompanied them into exile. As members of the armed forces, these officers were prohibited from belonging to any political party.

A military spokesperson reportedly labeled General Habyarimana "a Hutu extremist" on BBC radio and said that he had left to join Ugandans and Rwandan rebels in the Congo in fighting against Rwanda.³² On April 7, Foreign Minister Charles Murigande made clear in a radio interview that the government knew that at least Habyarimana had asked for asylum in Belgium.³³

On April 1, Major Felicien Ngirabatware, a friend of General Habyarimana and director of the Ruhengeri Military School, was arrested and has since been held incommunicado. Military intelligence officers have repeatedly interrogated the wives of the three soldiers who fled and of Major Ngirabatware.

On April 3, Damien Musayidizi "disappeared" on his way home from work. A former army sergeant, he had been Gen. Habyarimana's secretary at the ministry of defense.

On April 4, a Kigali shopkeeper, Jean-Marie Vianney Nkulikiyinka, was taken from his shop at about 10 p.m. by unidentified persons and has not been heard from since. Nkulikiyinka was not known to have played a political role but he was reportedly linked to Dr. Hitimana, next on the list of "disappeared" persons.

On April 7, Dr. Leonard Hitimana, a MDR deputy, "disappeared" between 8 and 9 p.m. apparently after having left the home of another MDR deputy in the Remera section of Kigali. The police announced that Hitimana's car had been found near the Ugandan frontier, but his family rejected any suggestion that he might have driven there at night, left his vehicle, and fled across the border. Dr. Hitimana is one of those MDR members whose record calls into question assertions about the genocidal nature of the party. He is widely acknowledged to have tried to save Tutsi during the genocide and has testified in trials against persons accused of genocide.³⁴

On April 23, Lieut. Col. Augustin Cyiza, a demobilized officer of the Rwandan army, formerly president of the Cour de Cassation and vice-president of the Supr eme Court, "disappeared" after having taught a law class at the University of Central Africa in Kigali. He failed to respond to calls on his cellular telephone and his vehicle apparently disappeared from the city streets. Initial inquiries to police and judicial authorities elicited no information about his whereabouts, but some days later police reportedly told Cyiza's family that his vehicle had been found in the northwestern district of Butaro, near the Ugandan frontier.The police spokesman, Tony Kuramba, told others that Cyiza's vehicle was found in Nkumba district, adjacent to Butaro. According to witnesses, however, his vehicle was seen the night of his "disappearance" in the Kanombe military camp. Some military sources say that Cyiza is now detained at the military camp Kami or at the military prison at Mulindi.³⁵

A university student and cantonal judge from the court of Nyamata named Eliezer Runyaruka left the university with Cyiza on April 23 and has also not been heard from since. When his relatives appealed to police for information they were reportedly told that Eliezer "had been in league with Cyiza" and had fled the country with him. Eliezer was a Munyamulenge, a Kinyarwanda speaking person from the Congo. The Banyamulenge are generally counted as Tutsi. Cyiza regularly transported Eliezer to and from the university.³⁶

Associations and the Press

Commission members claimed that MDR members used not-for-profit associations to disseminate party ideology. They established that the office of the prime minister had given 200,000 Rwandan francs ($400) and that several other politicians had given lesser amounts to the organization Itara, but they did not establish that the organization was related to the MDR or even that it had a political agenda.³⁷

According to the founding members and officers of Itara, the organization did construction work and other business activities to benefit young people without other employment, particularly those who had suffered from the genocide.³⁸ Commission members and others referred to information from a disgruntled former vice-president of Itara as if that proved the claim that the organization was a front for MDR activities, but the one letter from this person published by the commission states merely that he was leaving Itara because

• the organization wanted to make a profit for its members rather than conforming to its original non-for-profit purpose
  
   
• the division of members into work groups must be meant to hide something
  
   
• the organization engaged in discrimination and regionalism.³⁹

   

When asked by the commission about the "discrimination" practiced by Itara, the former vice-president complained that people hired by the organization had all been from the province of Gikongoro. He said nothing about ethnic discrimination.⁴⁰

The extent of the organization was also at issue. In late December 2002 Minister of Internal Security Jean de Dieu Ntiruhungwa compared Itara to the Interahamwe, a militia that played a major role in the 1994 genocide and asserted that Itara numbered some 10,000 members. The association filed a complaint with the prosecutor general of the republic against Ntiruhungwa for having made these inaccurate statements, but no action has yet been taken on it.⁴¹

When the General Commissioner of National Police appeared before the commission on February 27, he was pressed for information on the number of Itara members. He gave no estimate but asserted that the organization was active throughout the country. In that connection he cited the letter described above which in fact says nothing about the size of the organization.⁴² In the annex to the report, the commission published an intelligence report stating that Itara had registered 435 young people for its work projects.⁴³ The Secretary General of Security Services told the commission that Itara had ceased its activities throughout the country once the assembly began to discuss the organization. He then added that the Jeunesse Démocratique Republicaine (JDR)-the MDR youth organization from the 1990's-was presen t throughout the country and that it was "a bomb waiting to explode."⁴⁴ It is unclear why he raised the JDR unless he wished to suggest a link between that organization, which no longer officially exists, and Itara.

Commission members used the MDR affair as an occasion to attack the Rwandan League for the promotion and defense of human rights (Ligue Rwandaise pour la promotion et la defense des droits de l'homme, Liprodhor), the most credible human rights organization in Rwanda. A balanced and well-informed observer of the human rights situation, Liprodhor has been repeatedly harassed by the government in the past. Its treasurer has been imprisoned for ten months on accusations of having supported the PDR-Ubuyanja (see below). During the debate over the MDR report, Protais Kabanda Mitari, deputy and vice-president of the commission, claimed that MDR members- said to be affiliated with the genocidal MDR-Power-- collaborated with Liprodhor and that the human rights group received money from abroad to aid the MDR efforts. According to the commission, a local administrator from the northwest of the country also implicated Liprodhor in MDR meetings.⁴⁵ Neither the report nor the annex offered any proof to support claims that the human rights organization was involved in MDR activities. The commission did accuse a former employee of the organization now active in the MDR of being a propagandist for divisionist ideology.

The commission also mentioned two other associations but without giving any details about their membership or supposed activities, one the National Association of Retired People (ANR) and the other an organization for Hutu unity.⁴⁶

The commission said that MDR members used newspapers like Umuseso and Le Partisan to disseminate their ideas.⁴⁷ In January 2002 Le Partisan published an article detailing RPF efforts to control the MDR. The author of the article, Amiel Nkuliza, was detained for several days and the MDR secretary general Pierre Gakwandi was jailed on suspicion of having been the source of information published in the article. Nkuliza later fled the country and Le Partisan stopped publishing. Fifteen months later Gakwandi remains in prison and has not been tried. Umuseso is the one independent journal currently publishing in Rwanda. Its editor Ismael Mbonigaba was jailed in late January 2003 for having published an article about a possible presidential contest between Kagame and Twagiramungu. The article, said to be "divisionist," was accompanied by a cartoon showing Kagame in the role of King Solomon deciding the fate of the MDR. Mbonigaba was provisionally released in late February and has not been tried. On April 15 Mbonigaba circulated an informal account of the MDR debate under the heading of a journal called Indorerwamo/Le Miroir. A week later officials seized an issue of Indorerwamo/Le Miroir that gave extensive coverage of the MDR affair. Police said they confiscated the journal because it was new and had failed to conform to regulations concerning the publication of a new newspaper. The editor argued that the journal had been published first in 1997 and again since 2002 as a supplement to Umuseso.⁴⁸